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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 







JOEL DOE, A Minor, by and through his Guardians 
John Doe and Jane Doe; MACY ROE; MARY SMITH; 
JACK JONES, A minor, by and through his Parents 
John Jones and Jane Jones, *CHLOE JOHNSON, A minor 
by and through her Parent Jane Johnson; *JAMES JONES, A Minor 
by and through his Parents John Jones and Jane Jones, 




BOYERTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
DR. BRETT COOPER, In his official capacity as Principal; 
DR. E. WAYNE FOLEY, In his official capacity as Assistant Principal; 
DAVID KREM, Acting Superintendent 
 
PENNSYLVANIA YOUTH CONGRESS FOUNDATION (Intervenor in D.C.) 
 

















Present: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, AMBRO, CHAGARES, JORDAN, 
HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, BIBAS, 
and NYGAARD*, Circuit Judges 
 
 
 The petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc filed by appellants in the 
above-entitled case has been submitted to the judges who participated in the decision of 
this Court and to all the other available circuit judges of the circuit in regular active 
service.  The judges who issued the Court’s decision have voted to grant panel rehearing.  
Accordingly, the opinion entered June 18, 2018 is hereby VACATED and a revised 
opinion will be entered.  The petition for rehearing en banc is denied without prejudice in 
light of the grant of panel rehearing. The parties may renew their request for rehearing en 
banc within fourteen days of the date of this order pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 35(c) and 
40(a)(1) (permitting a court to extend the time for filing a petition for rehearing en banc). 
Judge Jordan would have granted rehearing en banc and writes separately on the matter, 
joined by Judges Chagares, Hardiman, and Bibas.   
 
      BY THE COURT, 
 
 
      s/ Theodore A. McKee 
      Circuit Judge 
Date: July 26, 2018 
CJG/cc: All Counsel of Record 
 
                                                     
* The Honorable Richard L. Nygaard’s vote is limited to panel rehearing. 
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge, joined by Chagares, Hardiman and 
Bibas, Circuit Judges, dissenting. 
 
 The record in this case, as described in the revised panel 
opinion, can support the factual conclusion that the Boyertown 
Area School District engaged in a thoughtful and deliberative 
process to address a controversy over transgender students’ 
desire to use school bathrooms and locker rooms of their 
choice.  Those same facts also can support the legal conclusion 
that the policy Boyertown eventually decided upon is sufficient 
to withstand the Appellants’ request for a preliminary 
injunction.  Thus, my purpose in writing now is not to take 
issue with the panel’s ultimate denial of injunctive relief.  It is 
rather to note my disagreement with the panel’s suggestion that 
it would have been a violation of federal law for the school 
district to adopt a policy requiring transgender students to 
either use a single-user bathroom or facilities corresponding to 
their biological sex.1  Accordingly, I dissent from the Court’s 
denial of the Appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc. 
 
 The revised panel opinion rightly acknowledges that a 
school policy addressing transgender students’ use of 
bathrooms and locker rooms is a matter of high importance to 
Boyertown and its students.  Given that public importance and 
the obvious sensitivity of the issues involved, one would have 
thought that the opinion would address only the facts at issue 
and then only to the extent necessary.  But the panel went 
beyond what was necessary when it chose to address 
Boyertown’s tangential argument that the school district would 
have run afoul of Title IX had it implemented a policy that 
confined transgender students to use of bathrooms and locker 
rooms designated for their biological sex.  The revised panel 
opinion claims that “requiring transgender students to use 
single user or birth-sex-aligned facilities is its own form of 
discrimination.”  Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., No. 17-
3113, slip op. at 19 (3d Cir. July 26, 2018).  In approving 
                                                            
1 As an aside, I also note my discomfort with the tone 
of the opinion at certain points, which, despite the panel 
members’ assurance that they do not intend to minimize the 
concerns of the Appellants regarding privacy in dealing with 
hygiene and bodily functions, seems very much to minimize 
those concerns and treat them as a thin cover for bigotry. 
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Boyertown’s decision to permit transgender students to use the 
bathrooms and locker rooms of their choice, the revised 
opinion implies that the school district would have been legally 
mistaken to do otherwise, saying Boyertown “can hardly be 
faulted for … adopting a policy that avoids the issues that may 
otherwise have occurred under Title IX.”  Id. at 29. 
 
 That suggestion is unnecessary and is certainly open to 
debate.2  True, the revised opinion is not as far out on a limb as 
the originally published opinion was.   The idea that Boyertown 
could not have designed a constitutionally acceptable policy 
that required transgender students to use single-user bathrooms 
and locker room facilities or ones corresponding to their 
biological sex was more explicit in that earlier opinion.  See 
Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 893 F.3d 179, 199 (3d Cir. 
2018) (“Title IX prohibits discrimination against transgender 
students in school facilities ….  Therefore a court may not issue 
an injunction that would subject the transgender students to 
different conditions than their cisgender peers are subjected 
                                                            
2  Underlying that debate is the substantial controversy 
over how to interpret the meaning of the word “sex” in Title 
IX, namely, whether Title IX’s use of the term denotes only 
biological sex or if it also encompasses concepts of gender 
identity.  In assuming the latter, the revised opinion ignores 
the clear-statement rule, which limits liability for legislation 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause such as Title IX.  
See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 640 
(1999) (treating Title IX as Spending Clause legislation); 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981) (adopting clear-statement rule for Spending Clause 
legislation).  That rule requires “Congress [to] speak with a 
clear voice” and “unambiguously” put state funding recipients 
on notice of the conditions of federal funds.  Pennhurst, 451 
U.S. at 17.  Nowhere does Title IX unambiguously specify 
liability for failure to open locker rooms and bathrooms to 
transgender students of the opposite sex.  I am not 
encouraging the panel to go deeper into dicta by addressing 
the clear-statement rule.  I am simply pointing out that one of 
the problems with sweeping statements of the sort that still 
characterize the revised opinion is that they sidestep nuanced 
analysis that would necessarily be undertaken if a properly 
presented issue were under consideration. 
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to.”), vacated by order of July 26, 2018.  Nevertheless, even 
the revised opinion appears to communicate the same 
unwarranted and unsupported implication.  Although I 
appreciate the panel’s thoughtful effort to cure the overreach 
in its now-vacated opinion, it still wrongly suggests that our 
Court has reached decisions that it has not. 
 
 There is a good reason why we avoid wading into 
fraught waters without needing to and without careful legal 
analysis supporting the conclusions we reach.  Dicta are often 
dangerous.  Because they are unmoored from any concrete set 
of facts and are frequently the product of judicial musing rather 
than adversarial presentations from parties with a vested 
interest in exploring issues in detail, dicta can be ill-informed.  
All too often, they can short-circuit the legal process and end 
up substituting mere assertion for reason.  As has been wisely 
observed, “[t]he problem is that dicta no longer have the 
insignificance they deserve.  They are no longer ignored.  
Judges do more than put faith in them; they are often treated as 
binding law. The distinction between dictum and holding is 
more and more frequently disregarded.”  Pierre N. Leval, 
Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1249, 1250 (2006). 
 
Reasonable people can and will disagree about the most 
appropriate way to address transgender students’ desire to 
select which bathroom or locker room facilities to use.  It is a 
problem without a perfect solution, and we have not even 
begun to analyze those competing interests except for in this 
one specific fact circumstance presented for preliminary 
injunctive relief.  Despite that, the panel’s dicta in the revised 
opinion continue to imply otherwise, and so are likely to 
handicap efforts by local school districts throughout this 
Circuit to thoughtfully address how to best handle the issue in 
their own communities.  The law does not mandate only one 
outcome, as the panel opinion suggests.3   
                                                            
3  The revised panel opinion still relies on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
opinion in Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified School District No. 1 
Board of Education, 858 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2017).  The 
court in Whitaker affirmed a lower court’s order granting the 




It is the province of elected officials, including those on 
local school boards, to weigh competing interests and debate 
the wisdom of policy choices.  It is our role to assess whether 
a specific policy choice, as understood in a specific factual 
context, violates the Constitution or other federal law.  That is 
as far as we should go. 
  
In short, because “both the adversary system and the 
premise that courts have less authority to prescribe general-
                                                            
boys’ bathrooms at school.  Id. at 1039.  Employing a sex-
stereotyping theory of discrimination, the court reasoned that 
the student had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of 
success on a Title IX claim that the school district had 
discriminated on the basis of sex by prohibiting use of the 
boys’ bathrooms.  Id.  The sex-stereotyping theory, also 
known as gender-stereotyping, derives from Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).  We have 
accepted that theory and permit plaintiffs to sue for sex 
discrimination on the basis of “noncompliance with gender 
stereotypes.”  Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 
285, 290 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).  According to 
Whitaker, “[a] policy that requires an individual to use a 
bathroom that does not conform with his or her gender 
identity punishes that individual for his or her gender non-
conformance[.]”  858 F.3d at 1049.  Whitaker is alone among 
the courts of appeals, however, in concluding that a policy 
requiring employees or students to utilize bathroom facilities 
corresponding to their biological sex is tantamount to sex-
stereotyping discrimination.  Indeed, the issue has been 
viewed very differently by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit.  That court has stated in a Title VII case 
that “prohibition on sex discrimination, however, does not 
extend so far” as to require a government entity to permit a 
transsexual person to use the bathroom designated for use by 
persons of the opposite biological sex.  Etsitty v. Utah Transit 
Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007).  And Title IX’s 
implementing regulations expressly permit schools to 
“separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on the 
basis of sex.”  34 C.F.R. § 106.33.  To say or imply that there 
is only one legally defensible policy decision that a school 
district can reach is not only unsupported; it is unsupportable. 
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purpose rules than do legislatures are so firmly rooted in 
American legal practice as to rank as axiomatic[,]” Michael C. 
Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1997, 2003 
(1994) (footnote omitted), it is equally axiomatic that we 
should confine ourselves to resolving the specific matters 
before us, not some bigger issue we might like to address.  I 
therefore vote for rehearing en banc to vacate the panel opinion 
and give our full Court the opportunity to consider the case and 
articulate an appropriately limited rationale for our result. 
